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I. INTRODUCTION
Most Americans today are familiar with the warnings that police
officers generally give to suspects when they are arrested: "You have the
right to remain silent .... [If] you give [up that right] anything you say [can
and] will be used against you in [a] court of law. You have the right to an
attorney. In the ... event that [you] can't afford one ... the court will appoint
one to you."' These warnings derive from the United States Supreme Court's
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1. Law & Order: Special Victims Unit: Brotherhood (NBC television broadcast Jan. 6, 2004);
accord Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L.
REv. 1000, 1000 (2001) [hereinafter Leo, Questioning] ("The Miranda warnings themselves have become
so well-known through the media of television that most people recognize them immediately."); Meghan
J. Ryan, Miranda's Truth: The Importance of Adversarial Testing and Dignity in Confession Law, 43 N.
KY. L. REv. 413, 416 (2016) [hereinafter Ryan, Miranda's Truth] ("Most American adults can easily recite
the Miranda warnings, probably because of their constant repetition on police procedural television
shows."); see also Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 449
(2002) ("Most people familiar with police television programs, movies, or books understand Miranda to
require police to advise suspects of their rights to silence and counsel."); Law & Order: Special Victims
Unit: Birthright (NBC television broadcast Sept. 21, 2004) ("You have the right to remain silent. If you
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1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona,2 in which the Court held that, unless police
officers take sufficient procedural safeguards before obtaining a suspect's
statement pursuant to custodial interrogation, that statement is
inadmissible. 3  In Miranda, the Court indicated that providing so-called
Miranda warnings is a way to sufficiently protect the suspects' rights against
self-incrimination.4
When Miranda was decided, law enforcement feared that the decision
would severely hamper police officers' ability to investigate cases and protect
the public.5 Most commentators acknowledged that the decision would have
an impact on law enforcement,6 but no one knew how severe that impact
would be. Now, over fifty years after Miranda was decided, there are still
questions about the full impact that the case has had on law enforcement. As
give up that right, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law."). These warnings
derive from the Court's language in Miranda v. Arizona:
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised
to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
2. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
3. See id at 444. The Supreme Court has since held that there are some exceptions to this rule-
conditions under which an unmirandized confession under these circumstances would be admissible at
trial. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651, 653 (1984) (finding a public safety exception to
Miranda); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (finding that unmirandized statements may be
used for impeachment purposes).
4. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at444. Also, although "[t]he Miranda opinion is explicitly based on the
Fifth Amendment right that one cannot be compelled to be a witness against oneself in a criminal case ...
Miranda is really rooted in a constellation of constitutional rights that includes not only the right not to
incriminate oneself but also the rights to the assistance of counsel and due process." Ryan, Miranda's
Truth, supra note 1, at 414.
5. See Richard A. Leo, The Impact ofMiranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 622
(1996) [hereinafter Leo, Impact of Miranda] ("In its immediate aftermath, the Miranda opinion was
assailed by police, prosecutors, politicians, and media. Police officials complained indignantly that
Miranda would handcuff their investigative abilities.").
6. See id.; Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.
J. 1519, 1578 (1967) ("Miranda provoked an immediate rash of comment .... The overwhelming
majority warned that interrogations are essential to effective law enforcement. This assumption, coupled
with the assumption about the impact of warnings on suspect behavior, led them to conclude that law
enforcement would be substantially hampered by the Miranda rules."). Professor Leo has related:
In its immediate aftermath, the Miranda opinion was assailed by police, prosecutors,
politicians, and media. Police officials complained indignantly that Miranda would handcuff
their investigative abilities. Politicians linked Miranda to rising crime rates: Richard Nixon
publicly denounced Miranda and other Warren Court decisions as representing a victory of the
"crime forces" over the "peace forces" in American society, while individual congressmen
called for Chief Justice Earl Warren's impeachment. Congress as a whole responded to
Miranda by attempting legislatively to invalidate its holding in the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Newspaper editorials deplored the Warren Court's "coddling of
criminals," while cartoonists lampooned the logic of the Miranda decision.
Leo, Impact ofMiranda, supra note 5, at 622 (footnotes omitted).
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the question has been formulated for this Symposium, is Miranda good news
or bad news for the police?7
This question of whether Miranda is good news or bad news for the
police can have many different answers depending on what is considered
good or bad news for the police. If we think of the police being on the side
of fairness and equality, then Miranda might very well be a good thing to the
extent that the rule puts all defendants on an even playing field-at least
theoretically.' If we think of the police being tasked with building cases
against suspects, then Miranda might be a bad thing if it makes it less likely
for suspects to confess.' Of course, if we consider whether those confessions
are reliable"o confessions or false confessions," it might affect our
determination as to whether Miranda is good or bad news overall and,
perhaps separately, whether it constitutes good or bad news for the police.
Also, Miranda might be good news for the police because of the sanitizing
effect that the warnings have on confessions generally.12 Miranda might be
7. See 11th Annual Criminal Law Symposium Schedule, TEX. TECH L. REv. (Mar. 31, 2017),
http://texastechlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/1lth-Annual-Criminal-Law-Symposium-Schedule-1-
1.pdf.
8. There has been significant criticism, though, that many defendants lack the capacity to
comprehend Miranda warnings, rendering the warnings in those circumstances ineffectual and putting
these particular defendants on a different playing field than defendants with, for example, higher
intelligence quotients. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution,
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 495,495 (2002) ("The results show that,
in contrast to the nondisabled controls, mentally retarded people simply do not understand the
warnings .... For mentally retarded people, the Miranda warnings are words without meaning.");
Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 63, 75 (2008) ("The most obvious and far-reaching conclusion from the current data is
that typical juvenile Miranda warnings are far beyond the abilities of the more than 115,000 preteen
offenders charged annually with criminal offenses." (citation omitted)).
9. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's "rules impair, if
they will not eventually serve wholly to frustrate, an instrument of law enforcement that has long and quite
reasonably been thought worth the price paid for it" because "[t]here can be little doubt that the Court's
new code would markedly decrease the number of confessions"). Justice White, dissenting, wrote: "The
rule announced today will measurably weaken the ability of the criminal law to perform these tasks. It is
a deliberate calculus to prevent interrogations, to reduce the incidence of confessions and pleas of guilty
and to increase the number of trials." Id. at 541 (White, J., dissenting).
10. Throughout this Article, I often use the terms "reliable" and "reliability" to indicate
trustworthiness. Even though, in the scientific community, the terms "accurate" and "accuracy" may be
more appropriate, "reliable" and "reliability" are in greater conformity with the legal literature. See
Meghan J. Ryan, Innocence Ignorance: The Failure to Acknowledge the Fallibility and Dignity
Components of Humanity, in Lucien E. Dervan et al., Voices on Innocence, 68 FLA. L. REv. 1569, 1582
n.87 (2016).
11. Recent data suggests that at least 253 out of 2,124 (or about 12%) wrongful convictions resulted,
at least in part, from false confessions. See National Registry of Exonerations, U. MICH. L. SCH.,
https://www.law.umich.edulspecial/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View-{faf6eddb-5a68-4f8f-8a52-
2c61f5bf9ea7}&SortField=FC&SortDirc-As&FilterFieldl=FC&FilterValuel=8jFC (last visited Nov.
24, 2017).
12. See Leo, Questioning, supra note 1, at 1021-22 ("By creating the opportunity for police to read
suspects their constitutional rights and by allowing police to obtain a signed waiver form that signifies
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considered bad news for the police simply because it requires more resources
that the police probably consider to be already too limited." But Miranda
might be good news if it requires the police to engage in more careful
investigations-which could both improve the reliability of convictions and
also foster increased skill among police officers. 14
Over the course of the last fifty years, since Miranda was decided, there
has been quite a bit of a discussion about whether Miranda is good news or
bad news for the police. Much of this discussion has focused on the latter
question-whether it is bad news." And bad news in this context generally
seems to be defined as reducing the number of confessions and also crime
clearance and conviction rates." The ideas here are that suspects'
confessions lead to conviction of the guilty and that clearance and conviction
consensual and non-coercive interrogation, Miranda has helped the police shield themselves from
evidentiary challenges, rendering admissible otherwise questionable and/or involuntary confessions.").
13. See PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS 144 (1977) (noting
that "[it was thought that Supreme Court rulings such as Escobedo (1963) and Miranda (1966), which
imposed additional restrictions on the police and limited the police practice of interrogation, would
encourage investigators to rely more heavily on the scientific analysis of physical evidence and less on
confessions and other forms of evidence"); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REV.
429, 517 (2002) (noting that "requiring police to give Miranda warnings costs the police time and money
every time a suspect heeds the warning").
14. Cf XI NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF'T, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 5 (1931) (stating that egregious law enforcement practices-referred to in the report as
"the third degree"-"[n]ot only ... involve a flagrant violation of law by the officers of the law, but ...
also . . . tend[] to make police and prosecutors less zealous in the search for objective evidence" and
quoting officials stating that employing these practices are "a short cut and make[] the police lazy and
unenterprising" and that, "[i]f you use your fists, you are not so likely to use your wits"), quoted in
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447-48. Of course, improving the skills of police officers might be considered a
negative effect if the skills developed consist of manipulating suspects. See Richard A. Leo, Miranda's
Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 L. & SOC'Y REV. 259, 266 (1996) [hereinafter
Leo, Miranda's Revenge] ("In the past 30 years, police interrogators have refined their skills in human
manipulation and become confidence men par excellence.").
15. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 387, 390-91 (1996) [hereinafter Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs] (arguing through empirical
evidence that "Miranda has significantly harmed law enforcement efforts in this country"); John J.
Donohue I, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1148-49 (1998)
(criticizing an empirical analysis of Miranda's effect on law enforcement conducted by Paul Cassell and
Richard Fowles); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 502 (1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical
Effect] (criticizing Paul Cassell's empirical analysis on Miranda's effect on law enforcement and
concluding that, "[flor all practical purposes, Miranda's empirically detectable harm to law enforcement
shrinks virtually to zero").
16. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective
on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1998) [hereinafter
Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?] ("The strongest candidate for such a statistic is the crime
'clearance' rate, the rate at which police 'clear' or solve crimes."); Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs, supra
note 15, at 391 ("Miranda's effects should be measured not by looking at suppression motions filed after
police have obtained a confession, but rather by examining how many confessions police never obtain
because of Miranda."); Monica A. Walker, Do We Need a Clear-Up Rate?, 2 POLICING & SOC'Y 293,
304-05 (1992) (explaining that there are disadvantages to reporting clearance rates rather than conviction
rates).
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rates might be affected by suspects' post-Miranda reluctance to confess, and
by the greater resources that might now be necessary to elicit these
confessions."
This Article questions the usefulness of empirical studies in examining
this impact of Miranda. Part I provides a brief overview of the two
generations of empirical studies attempting to examine Miranda's impact on
the police." Professor Paul Cassell and his collaborators have argued-for
decades-that Miranda has, caused suspects' confession rates, police
clearance rates, and actual convictions to plummet.1 9 Most scholars have
taken issue with their methods and conclusions, though, determining that
Miranda has not had such a negative impact on the police.20 Part II of this
Article assays the difficulties associated with empirical studies.21 Good
studies require good data-a challenge in the context of studying the impact
of Miranda on the police.22 Even when reliable data is available, there are
challenges to carrying out good empirical research.23 Part HI questions what
the usefulness of good empirical studies is anyway.24 Even if reliable results
are achievable, what are we to glean from determining whether Miranda has
made it more difficult for police officers and prosecutors to elicit confessions,
clear crimes, and secure convictions?25 This Article concludes by
emphasizing the importance of considerations other than Miranda's impact
on the police. We should also take into account Miranda's impact on others,
17. See Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 16, at 1063-66.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs, supra note 15, at 417 ("The 'reliable'
studies . .. show . .. an average reported [confession rate] drop of 16.1%. In other words, based on the
comparative studies, the best estimate is that Miranda results in a lost confession in roughly one out of
every six criminal cases in this country."); Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 USC.
§ 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REv. 175, 255 (1999) ("If my conclusions in these
earlier articles are correct, Miranda substantially harms the ability of law enforcement to protect society.
Its technical rules prevent the conviction of countless guilty criminals, condemning victims of these crimes
to see justice denied and fear crimes reprised."); see also Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?, supra
note 16, at 1060 ("defend[ing] the position that Miranda was an important cause of the 1966-1968 drop
in clearance rates" and stating that, "[b]ecause confessions are needed to convict in about one out of every
four criminal cases, Miranda results in the loss of criminal convictions in about 3.8% of all criminal cases
(16% confession rate drop multiplied by the 24% confession necessity rate)").
20. See George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: "Embedded"
in our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 244 (2002) ("Though he has garnered considerable
attention from some of the nation's top law reviews, as well as the media, Cassell's quantitative claims
have not been generally accepted in either the legal or the social science community."); see also, e.g.,
Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect, supra note 15, at 502 (stating that Cassell's work "carries a built-in
risk of exaggerating Miranda's current impact on police effectiveness" and that "a close look at the details
shows that inconsistent and highly partisan procedures are necessary to bring Miranda's supposed attrition
effect up to Cassell's 3.8% figure").
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
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such as suspects and the public. Too narrow an inspection of Miranda's
impact leads to a myopic view of the landmark case.
II. MULTIPLE GENERATIONS OF STUDIES
Since Miranda was decided, scholars have conducted a number of
studies to examine whether the landmark case has really been detrimental to
police investigations and prosecutors securing convictions. As Professor
Thomas and Professor Leo so helpfully detailed in their 2002 article on the
effects of Miranda, there have been (at least) two generations of studies
examining the impact of the case. 26
In the first generation-studies from 1966 to 1973-there were about a
dozen studies looking to clarify the impact.2 7 Perhaps the most well-known
study from this generation was one in which 127 Yale law students observed
live interrogations in the New Haven Police Department and compared their
observations to data from the pre-Miranda period.28 The students found that
Miranda had a small impact in these cases; in 5% of the cases Miranda
seemed to have an adverse effect on the police officers' ability to elicit
information, including confessions, from suspects.29  The results from this
generation of studies are somewhat mixed with respect to confession rates,
though. For example, a study by James Witt found a reduced confession rate
of about 2% resulting from Miranda,3 0 a study by Richard Seeburger and
Stanton Wettick, Jr. found a reduced confession rate of about 16.9%,31 and a
26. See Thomas & Leo, supra note 20, at 232-45 (explaining that, "[iln the years immediately
following the Miranda decision, scholars published approximately a dozen empirical studies that sought
to fill this gap [in research]" and that, in the subsequent couple of decades, a handful of scholars continued
studying this topic).
27. Id. at 232 ("In the years immediately following the Miranda decision, scholars published
approximately a dozen empirical studies that sought to fill th[e] gap [in research on the subject].").
28. Id. at 233 ("One of the earliest and most widely cited studies was conducted by Yale law
students, who observed 127 live interrogations inside the New Haven Police Department during the
summer of 1966 and then compared their observations to data they reviewed from approximately 200
cases from 1960 to 1965 in the New Haven Police Department." (internal citation omitted)); see Wald et
al., supra note 6, at 1521-24, 1529-30.
29. See Wald et al., supra note 6, at 1573 ("The data suggest a decline of roughly 10 to 15 percent
from 1960 to 1966 in the number of people who gave some form of incriminating evidence over the entire
time. The greatest drop was in written statements.").
30. See James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the Administration ofCriminal Justice: The
Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320, 325 (1973), cited in
Thomas & Leo, supra note 20, at 234-35.
31. See Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh: A Statistical Study,
29 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 11 (1967) (finding "that before compliance with the Miranda requirements the
Detective Branch obtained confessions in 54.4% of the cases and after compliance in only 37.5% of the
cases"), cited in Thomas & Leo, supra note 20, at 237-38.
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study by Evelle Younger found an increased confession rate of about 10%.32
But, despite these different observed changes in confession rates, these
scholars generally found that Miranda had not negatively affected clearance
and conviction rates.33 For the most part, these early studies were not very
statistically sophisticated,34 but researchers ramped up their methodologies
in the second generation of empirical studies.35
With the second generation of studies-which Thomas and Leo defined
as from 1996 to at least 2002 (the year their article was published)-social
scientists jumped into the mix.3 6 The conclusions coming out of this second
generation of studies also produced somewhat mixed results. Probably most
famous in this generation is a series of studies conducted by Paul Cassell.3 7
In a 1996 study, Cassell concluded that Miranda resulted in a significant
(about 16%) reduction in confessions.38 Cassell's conclusions were roundly
criticized, though, perhaps most notably by Stephen Schulhofer.3 9
Schulhofer and Cassell faced off in a number of dueling articles in the
Northwestern University Law Review in 1996,4 in the Legal Times later that
32. See Evelle J. Younger, Results of a Survey Conducted in the District Attorney's Office of Los
Angeles County Regarding the Effect of the Miranda Decision Upon the Prosecution of Felony Cases, 5
AM. CRIM. L.Q. 32, 35 (1966), cited in Thomas & Leo, supra note 20, at 233-34.
33. See Thomas & Leo, supra note 20, at 238 (reporting that researchers in this first generation of
studies generally "reported that clearance and conviction rates had not been adversely affected by the new
Miranda requirements" even if they observed a decline in the confession rate).
34. See id (noting that "many of [the first-generation] studies are methodologically weak, perhaps
because many were conducted by lawyers or law professors without any training in the research methods
of social science").
35. See generally id. at 238-45; see also text accompanying notes 36-46 (summarizing the second
generation of studies).
36. See Thomas & Leo, supra note 20, at 238 (defining the second generation of studies as those
conducted between 1996 and the time the article was written-2002); see, e.g., Cassell & Fowles,
Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 16, at 1055 n.aa (employing Fowles's economic expertise); Leo,
Impact of Miranda, supra note 5, at 623 (applying the author's sociological expertise).
37. See Thomas & Leo, supra note 20, at 239 ("The best-known debate in the second-generation
studies has been between Cassell and Schulhofer.").
38. See Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs, supra note 15, at 417 ("The 'reliable' studies ... show
confession rate drops . . . an average reported drop of 16.1%. In other words, based on the comparative
studies, the best estimate is that Miranda results in a lost confession in roughly one out of every six
criminal cases in this country.").
39. See Thomas & Leo, supra note 20, at 244. Professors Thomas and Leo have stated:
Though he has garnered considerable attention from some of the nation's top law reviews, as
well as the media, Cassell's quantitative claims have not been generally accepted in either the
legal or the social science community. Instead, numerous scholars have disputed Cassell's
findings or inferences and criticized his objectivity, methodology, and conclusions.
Id. (citations omitted).
40. See generally Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs, supra note 15; Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical
Effect, supra note 15.
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year,4 1 once again in the Northwestern University Law Review,42 and in the
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy in 1997.43 Cassell then enlisted
an economist to help author a rejoinder-again arguing that Miranda
"handcuffed" law enforcement." This heated debate has continued, and
others have joined in, mostly on the side of Schulhofer rather than Cassell.4 5
They have all involved criticisms-and sometimes quite harsh ones-of the
data and methods employed in these various empirical studies.46
Taking a bird's-eye view of these studies-and putting aside their main
question of whether Miranda was in fact good news or bad news for the
police-raises two important, but sometimes overlooked or ignored, issues.
First, these studies are a good example of the many challenges inherent in
conducting empirical studies. These challenges range from securing reliable
data to controlling multiple-often difficult-to-predict-variables. And the
wide-ranging, ambitious project of studying Miranda's effect on law
enforcement exacerbates these challenges. The second issue that is important
to address is the potential usefulness of these studies. Why have researchers
expended so much effort on investigating the probably unknowable
relationship between the Miranda decision and confession, clearance, or
conviction rates? While it would be nice to know the exact effects of
Miranda on law enforcement, is the assumption here that, if Miranda has
been bad news for law enforcement, it should be discarded? It is important
41. See generally Paul G. Cassell, True Confessions About Miranda's Legacy, LEGAL TIMES, July
22, 1996; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Pointing in the Wrong Direction, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996.
42. See generally Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's
Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 278 (1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates].
43. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on Law Enforcement: Some
Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325 (1997); Steven J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda
Is Unjustfled-and Harmful, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347 (1997) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Bashing
Miranda Is Unjustified].
44. See generally Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 16; see also Paul G. Cassell
& Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685 (2017) [hereinafter Cassell &
Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops?] (using a quantitative approach to discuss the harmful effects of
Miranda on law enforcement and proposing an alternative to reduce these harms).
45. See generally, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 16; Cassell & Fowles,
Still Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 44; sources cited, supra note 43.
46. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 15, at 1156 ("To the extent my brief exploration into current
police practice is widely representative of police practice in the late 1960s and the 'other-crimes' effect is
small, however, the conclusion of the Cassell-Fowles paper concerning the effect of Miranda on clearance
rates is seriously compromised."); Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact
of Miranda on the Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 4 (2000) ("Although Professors Cassell and Fowles should
be commended for their efforts to raise the Miranda debate from the rhetorical to the empirical level, their
study fails to establish the conclusions that they reach."); Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda Is Unjustified,
supra note 43, at 371 ("The preceding discussion touches on many of the important flaws in Professor
Cassell's regression model; I have discussed others elsewhere."); Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance
Rates, supra note 42, at 291 ("At least seven flaws in Cassell's model impair the validity of [his]
conclusions .... ).
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to remember that Miranda's effect on law enforcement should not be the only
factor considered in assessing the importance and usefulness of
Miranda. Other matters, such as Miranda's effect on the public and the
importance of individuals' constitutionally-guaranteed rights, are also
important factors to consider.
m. THE CHALLENGES OF EvPIRICAL STUDIES
There are a number of challenges associated with empirical studies
generally and also with studying the particular relationship between Miranda
and confession, clearance, or conviction rates. Most of these issues revolve
around the particular questions asked and the quality of data available to
study in the context of Miranda.
First, there is an issue about which particular question, and thus the
proper data, researchers should examine to satisfy their research endeavors.
In assessing whether Miranda has been good news or bad news for the police,
there needs to be a determination of what constitutes good or bad news. In
most of the more recent studies attacking this question, researchers have
looked at all or some of the following: confession rates, clearance rates, and
conviction rates.4 7 For example, in his first law review article on the issue,
Cassell explained the importance of studying confession rates.4 8 But Cassel
later turned to examining clearance rates to determine the impact of Miranda
on the police.49 His detractors have commented on whether these variables
are useful in truly determining Miranda's impact."o Making the question a
47. See generally, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 16 (examining
clearance rates and corresponding losses in convictions); Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs, supra note 15
("To quantify Miranda's costs from lost cases, we must examine whether Miranda has produced any lost
confessions through its combination of warnings, waivers, and questioning cut-off rules."); Schulhofer,
Miranda's Practical Effect, supra note 15 (focusing on conviction rates).
48. See Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs, supra note 15, at 394 (explaining that "[t]o quantify
Miranda's costs from lost cases, we must examine whether Miranda has produced any lost confessions
through its combination of warnings, waivers, and questioning cut-off rules," but also noting that, "[i]n
assessing Miranda's costs, . . . we need quantification not only of changes in the confession rate due to
Miranda but also of the proportion of cases in which a confession is needed to convict").
49. See Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 16, at 1063 ("Since regularly
collected, long-term data on confession rates are unavailable, we must search for a second-best alternative.
The strongest candidate for such a statistic is the crime 'clearance' rate, the rate at which police 'clear' or
solve crimes."); see also Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 44, at 702 (conceding
that evidence on confession rates is limited and "that the existing empirical research on confession rates
has not resolved the question of whether Miranda has hampered law enforcement over the long haul," and
suggesting that clearance rates may be a useful variable to study in resolving the matter).
50. See, e.g., Feeney, supra note 46, at 113 ("Clearance rates are not just a poor way to measure the
effect of the Miranda decision on the ability of the police to combat crime, they are a profoundly
misleading and erroneous method for accomplishing this goal."); see also Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing
the Cops?, supra note 16, at 1060-66 (describing the advantages and disadvantages of studying
confession, clearance, and conviction rates); Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 31, at 6-22 (examining
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difficult one, there are both advantages and disadvantages to examining each
of these variables. For example, confession rates have the most direct
connection to the Supreme Court decision. This variable is probably the most
clearly linked to the Supreme Court's call for police officers to warn suspects
in custodial interrogation that they have "a right to remain silent, that any
statement [they do] make may be used as evidence against [them], and that
[they have] a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." But as scholars seem to have concluded, the data related to
confessions is quite limited.52 Confession rates have been systematically
recorded only sporadically.53 "[T]he only figures that exist were gathered by
individual researchers for particular cities on a one-time basis."54  There
seems to be much better data, though, at least in terms of quantity, with
respect to clearance rates." In fact, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
has consistently collected clearance rate data since the 1950s.56 However,
clearance rates, as well as conviction rates, are much more removed from the
Miranda decision than are confession rates, providing the opportunity for
confounding variables-variables that could have contributed to, or even
independently caused, any change in observed clearance or conviction
rates"-to bleed into the analysis. For example, anything from an increase
in funding for police departments to changes in law, either by court or statute,
could potentially affect clearance and conviction rates. To be sure, these and
other variables could affect confession rates as well, but because clearance
and conviction rates are more indirectly connected to Miranda than
confession rates, there is a greater chance for such confounding variables to
seep in and be confused with Miranda's effects on clearance and conviction
rates. Taking into account these complicating confounding variables and the
advantages and disadvantages of focusing on confession rates, clearance
rates, or conviction rates-or even something else-make designing a useful
empirical study linking Miranda to its effect on the police a challenge.
both conviction and clearance rates); Witt, supra note 30, at 328-31 (examining both conviction and
clearance rates).
51. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
52. See Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 16, at 1062 (noting the limited nature
of this data).
53. See id at 1061-62.
54. Id. at 1062.
55. See id at 1063 ("Since at least 1950, the FBI has collected clearance rate figures from around
the country and reported them annually in the Unform Crime Reports .... Because of this extended
range of data, clearance rates might permit a broad perspective on Miranda's effects."). Cassell has also
stated that "conviction rate data in this country are notoriously bad." Id. at 1066.
56. See id
57. See JEFFERY T. WALKER, STATISTICS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
32 (1st ed. 1999) ("A confounding variable is not the independent nor the dependent variable, but a
variable that influences the relationship between these two.").
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Beyond the decision of which variable(s) to study is the related question
of how reliable the underlying data actually is. Empirical studies can only be
as good as the data employed in them. And, as many of the scholars studying
this area have noted, there are some real problems with the data here.s8 First,
there is the question about how well this data is reported. For example,
sometimes the police have changing incentives for showing a higher or lower
clearance rate than actually exists." Further, different jurisdictions, or even
different departments, may have differing definitions of essential terms like
"clearance rates."60 Additionally, to control for confounding variables in
determining whether there really is a relationship between Miranda and, for
example, clearance rates, additional data is necessary-data like changes in
crime rates over time, resource allocations over time, and even the effects of
other Warren Court decisions.6 1 Gathering reliable data on these factors, too,
may be difficult. These types of issues pose real problems for the usefulness
of information gleaned from these empirical studies. One might even say
that this is a somewhat hopeless endeavor.
In addition to the challenge of focusing on the best question to examine
and the overwhelming data problems involved with these empirical studies,
there are a whole host of other issues, including methodology-whether the
researchers employ, for example, a "panel data analysis" or an "interrupted
time-series analysis" and the particular regression model used in the study.62
Even qualified experts can disagree on the proper approach to any particular
empirical study like the one at issue here. And the limitations on the data
available exacerbate these difficulties.
Now, empirical studies in the social sciences-like these studies of
Miranda's impact on the police-are often complicated. Yet, the work of
social scientists can be incredibly useful. With respect to Miranda, though,
it seems that the social science work might be more difficult because of
factors like the potential unreliability of data, as well as the lack of data
58. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 15, at 1151-56 (noting that the reporting of clearance rates may
have changed over time and that changes in the number of cleared cases may not be entirely attributable
to the Miranda decision); Feeney, supra note 46, at 11-18 (describing some of the problems with clearance
rate data).
59. See Donohue, supra note 15, at 1151-55 (outlining the reasons why data on changes in clearance
rates may not be accurate).
60. See Feeney, supra note 46, at 16-18 ("It is not surprising that different agencies interpreted the
rules in different ways or that the FBI attempted over the years to clarify the rules in ways to make the
interpretation more uniform.").
61. A number of criminal procedure cases were decided during Justice Earl Warren's tenure as the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. These include Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)-each of which could have potentially affected
confession, clearance, and conviction rates.
62. For a good, and relatively brief, methodological critique of the 1998 Cassell and Fowles study
examining the change in clearance rates resulting from the Miranda decision, see generally Donohue,
supra note 15.
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available. Additionally, there are interdisciplinary challenges when lawyers
not trained in the social sciences are (at least hopefully) interfacing with
social scientists who may not be trained in the law." Further, there are
always caveats and assumptions implicit in social science work, and there is
the risk that lawyers who are not more familiar with social science studies
may not take these caveats and assumptions seriously enough when assessing
the work. All of these factors complicate the empirical study of Miranda's
impact on the police and the consumption and use of the conclusions reached
in these studies.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF QUANTIFICATION
It is sometimes important to try to tackle difficult questions like "What
is Miranda's impact on the police?" even if the results reached are likely not
entirely accurate. But, over fifty years after Miranda was decided, there is
the question of why pinning down whether, and the extent to which, the case
has suppressed confessions, lowered clearance rates, and decreased
convictions remains important. Even if these Miranda studies are bulletproof
(and do not suffer from any of the concerns related to focusing on the best
variable(s) to study, problems with reliable data, and difficulties with
methodology), why do we care about the results? Why do we even care
whether Miranda is good news or bad news for the police? Perhaps the
answer to this question is obvious: If it is good news for the police, then we
should not lament the Supreme Court's 1966 opinion or try to argue for it to
be overturned. Perhaps we could also argue that, if Miranda is good news
for the police, then the Court ought not to cut back on the Miranda doctrine
as it has in many ways since the seminal case was decided. One might even
go so far as to argue that, if Miranda is indeed good news for the police, then
the Court should be willing, and perhaps even anxious, to adopt more
prophylactic rules like Miranda64 in the criminal context or maybe even in
63. It is worth noting that the early empirical studies examining Miranda's. impact on the police
often did not employ the expertise of social scientists. See Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect, supra
note 15, at 506-07 (stating that "virtually all the studies were conducted by lawyers or law professors not
trained in the research methods of social science and they are replete with methodological weaknesses"
(quoting Richard Angelo Leo, Police Interrogation in America: A Study of Violence, Civility and Social
Change 332-33 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (internal
alterations omitted)); see also, e.g., Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 31; Younger, supra note 32. The
most recent studies on the topic, though, have involved the work of economists and sociologists. See, e.g.,
Donohue, supra note 15, at 1148 (applying the author's economic expertise); Leo, Impact of Miranda,
supra note 5, at 623 (applying the author's sociological expertise).
64. It is now well accepted that Miranda is a prophylactic rule. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984) (referring to "[t]he prophylactic Miranda warnings"); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic
Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100, 106 (1985)
("Miranda provides a good illustration of a rule properly categorized as prophylactic."); Michael J.
Zydney Mannheimer, The Two Mirandas, 43 N. Ky. L. REv. 317, 320 (2016) ("Miranda set forth
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other contexts as well. In contrast, then, perhaps if Miranda is bad news for
the police, the Supreme Court should continue to cut back on the doctrine or
perhaps even overrule it. Or, at a less extreme level, perhaps we should just
complain that Miranda is bad for the police. Miranda could also be used as
a cautionary tale about the possible negative effects of the Supreme Court
adopting prophylactic rules in future cases.
Something largely missing among the many examinations of Miranda
is a discussion of why the effects of the seminal case on the police should
matter and the extent to which they should matter. But this remains an
important piece of the puzzle. The language of the Fifth Amendment, which
provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself," suggests that the protection is absolute and that
enforcement of the right should not depend on how it affects the police.65
Similarly, the language of the Sixth Amendment, which was also implicated
in the Miranda holding and which states that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense," does not seem to contemplate weighing this privilege against its
effect on the police.66 And the Miranda opinion, itself, seems to eschew a
determination that the decision is based on the impact that the rule will have
on policing.67 The Court's language suggests that the Miranda holding is
unconditional rather than dependent on weighing the costs and benefits of the
rule.6 8
While the Miranda Court seems not to have suggested that the rule
hinges on policy considerations like the impact the rule has on the police, the
Miranda decision does sweep more broadly than the language of the Fifth
Amendment, so perhaps policy considerations like this are in fact relevant.
Indeed, the rule set forth in Miranda has been said to go too far.6 9 From the
beginning, Miranda was criticized for being unmoored from the language of
the Constitution." Even the Court, itself, has said that the opinion is
prophylactic rules for police to follow in order to avoid subjecting suspects to coercive interrogation.").
But cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (stating "that Miranda announced a
constitutional rule" (emphasis added)).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66. Id amend. VI.
67. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-91 (1966).
68. See id. at 479-81.
69. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) ("The Miranda exclusionary rule ... sweeps
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth
Amendment violation.").
70. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "the Court's holding [was
not] compelled nor even strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth Amendment"); Gregory L.
Diskant, Exclusion of Confessions Obtained without Miranda Warnings in Civil Tax Fraud Proceedings,
73 COLUM. L. REv. 1288, 1304-05 (1973) ("[T]here is no specific language in Miranda which gives
significant support to the claim that the [F]ifth [A]mendment violation attaches at interrogation."); see
also Grano, supra note 64, at 106-11 (explaining how the Miranda holding is prophylactic); Timothy P.
O'Neill, Rethinking Miranda: Custodial Interrogation as a Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, 37
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"prophylactic," extending further than the language the Constitution might
require.n Rather than focusing on the constitutional text, the Miranda
decision hinged on the Court's concern about the interrogation practices
police officers regularly employed to elicit confessions,72 the fragile
relationship between the government and its citizens,7 3 and the historically
interpreted breadth of the constitutional provision protecting the right against
self-incrimination.74 Relying on this variety of considerations, the Court's
decision could possibly be said, at least in part, to engage in something
resembling a policy-based cost-benefit analysis that should, indeed, take into
account Miranda's impact on law enforcement.
The majority opinion in Miranda, though, seemed to reject reliance on
the rule's potentially negative impact on the police. The Court explained
that, "[T]he Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when
confronted with the power of government when it provided in the Fifth
Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against
himself' and that this "right cannot be abridged."75 Further, despite the
breadth of Miranda's rule, the Court clearly stated in Dickerson v. United
States that Miranda is a constitutional rule, not merely a regulatory rule or
suggestion for police officers to follow. 7 6  Moreover, the Justices on the
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1109, 1111 (2004) ("[B]eginning in 1974, the Burger Court repeatedly held that
Miranda warnings themselves were not actually required by the Fifth Amendment, but functioned rather
as a 'prophylactic' that over-protected the right against self-incrimination. . . ."); William T. Pizzi &
Morris B. Hoffman, Taking Miranda's Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REv. 813, 816 (2005) (stating that "[t]he
Court's interpretation [in Miranda] was . .. an unprecedented stretch of the language of the
Self-Incrimination Clause").
71. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) ("The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore
are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination is protected." (internal quotations and alterations omitted)).
72. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-47 (expressing concern about police interrogation practices,
stating that "[a]n understanding of the nature and setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential to
[the Court's] decisions[]," and explaining that, "[u]nless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation
is achieved . .. there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable
future").
73. See id. at 460 ("We have recently noted that the privilege against self-incrimination-the
essential mainstay of our adversary system-is founded on a complex of values . . . . All these policies
point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."). Professor Philip
Bobbitt might describe this as a structural or ethical approach to constitutional interpretation. See PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION Ch. 6 (1982).
74. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459-61 (stating that the Court "cannot depart from th[e] noble
heritage" that the privilege against self-incrimination "has always been 'as broad as the mischief against
which it seeks to guard' and explaining that "the privilege has consistently been accorded a liberal
construction" in the United States Supreme Court). Professor Bobbitt might describe this as either a
doctrinal or historical approach to constitutional interpretation. See BOBBITT, supra note 73, at chs. 2 &
4.
75. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
76. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) ("[W]e conclude that Miranda
announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. Following the rule of stare
decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.").
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Miranda Court were aware of the potentially significant impact on the police
that the decision could have but still did not readily account for this impact
in the ruling." The majority only briefly referenced this concern. 78 In
contrast, Justices Harlan, White, and Stewart, dissenting in Miranda,
thoroughly considered the effect Miranda could have on the
police.79 Although the Court seemed to try to distance itself from such a
concern, the Court took pains to make clear that the Miranda rule should not
significantly burden police officers.8 o
If the proper constitutional approach to assessing the scope of the Fifth
Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination is actually a
policy-based nebulous balancing of the advantages and disadvantages of a
rule, then the impact of Miranda on the police is important information to
consider. But then it is also important not to forget that there are other factors
to consider as well. For example, one might consider the impact of Miranda
in fostering trust among the public. Perhaps informing suspects of their rights
creates goodwill among suspects and the community at large, encouraging
the public to trust and cooperate with police officers. One might consider
Miranda's effect in deterring crime, if it has any effect in that area. One
might consider what Miranda really focused on-the fairness to the
defendants and the wily interrogation techniques employed by the police-
something that, perhaps to the chagrin of the majority in Miranda, was not
significantly diminished in the wake of the landmark case.8 ' Even Miranda
itself focused on other considerations, like the adversarial-testing approach
of the criminal justice system and a suspect's dignity. 82
77. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481.
78. See id
79. See id. at 539-41 (White, J., dissenting) ("The rule announced today will measurably weaken
the ability of the criminal law to perform ... tasks [of incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation]. It is
a deliberate calculus to prevent interrogations, to reduce the incidence of confessions and pleas of guilty
and to increase the number of trials."). Justice Harlan, dissenting, said that, "What the Court largely
ignores is that its rules impair, if they will not eventually serve wholly to frustrate, an instrument of law
enforcement that has long and quite reasonably been thought worth the price paid for it. There can be
little doubt that the Court's new code would markedly decrease the number of confessions." Id. at 516
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 479-91 ("The limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute
an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement. As we have noted, our decision does not
in any way preclude police from carrying out their traditional investigatory functions.").
81. See Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826, 1827 (1987) ("Although Miranda warnings may seem adequate from
the detached perspective of a trial or appellate courtroom, in the harsh reality of a police interrogation
room they are woefully ineffective."); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519,
1521 (2008) ("The best evidence now shows that, as a protective device, Miranda is largely dead."); see
also Cloud et al., supra note 8, at 572 ("These empirical results demonstrate that the Miranda warnings
are not 'effective' for the population of mentally retarded people, and likely are ineffective for many
nonretarded people of below-average intelligence.").
82. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 ("We have recently noted that the privilege against
self-incrimination-the essential mainstay of our adversary system-is founded on a complex of values.
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V. CONCLUSION
There are numerous empirical studies examining whether Miranda has
been good news or bad news for the police in terms of decreasing confession,
clearance, and conviction rates." As with all empirical studies, though, it is
important to critically examine the methodologies employed and conclusions
reached by the researchers conducting these studies.84 In examining what
impact Miranda has had on the police, there are real concerns about the
reliability of the data on which these studies are built and also the
formulations of the questions investigated and methodological frameworks
within which these studies are conducted." But even putting aside these
concerns, it is important to assay why Miranda's impact on the police
actually matters over fifty years after the seminal case was decided and after
the decision's resulting Miranda warnings have been thoroughly
incorporated into both our criminal justice system and the national culture.
Would such a determination affect how today's courts interpret the privilege
against self-incrimination or how courts approach other questions of
constitutional interpretation? If Miranda's impact on the police is really
relevant to determining the scope of criminal defendants' rights, then it is
important not to lose sight of the fact that such a policy-based constitutional
analysis would also entail examining the impact of Miranda on other
stakeholders, such as society and criminal defendants themselves. Impact on
the police would be just one of many relevant factors to consider.
All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
is the respect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."
(citations omitted)); see also Ryan, Miranda's Truth, supra note 1, at 414 ("The Miranda decision
highlights the importance of adversarial testing and dignity.").
83. See supra Part I.
84. See supra Part III.
85. See supra Part III.
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